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This paper is an attempt to illustrate the relative importance of 
class politics for the development of entrepreneurs. To do this, it 
will examine the development of indigenous entrepreneurs in the 
manufacturing sector of Kano. This exercise will show that entry 
into this sector of Kano's state economy is determined by one's 
access to certain services crucial for successful performance. 
Access to these services and privileges is in turn determined by the 
structure of relationships to which one belongs in the society. This 
entry process could be difficult, if not impossible, without 
contacts which are facilitated by this class affiliation. This class 
and its attendant behaviors have had a serious impact on the 
socio-economic development of Kano, and on indigenous entrepreneurs 
in particular. 
For clear presentation, this paper is divided into three parts. 
The first section traces the evolution of a class of oligarchs who 
control the economy of Kano, whose activities therefore affect the 
pattern of investment in the various sectors of the economy, and 
thus the development of entrepreneurs in these sectors. This survey 
starts from the nineteenth century and progresses into the 
twentieth. The second part of the paper dwells on the role of this 
class in the political economy of Kano since the 195Os. Here, a 
thorough examination is made of how these people manipulate policies 
and administrative machineries for their own benefit and how such 
machination determines or affects the pattern of investment· in the 
economy in general. The final section examines some of the 
consequences of such socio-economic structure on economic 
development, the indigenous entrepreneurs in particular. 
Evolution of the Oligarchy 
From the nineteenth century there emerged a group of traders in 
Kano whose descendants have come to play a prominent role in the 
political economy of Nigeria. These traders organized themselves 
into merchant houses such as the Agalawa, Tokarawa, Madabo, Darma, 
Bakin Ruwa, Koko Dal a, and Salga houses. 1 Some of the influential 
merchants of these houses were Tambarin Agalawa Yakubu, Bawa (his 
neighbor) Madugu Kosai, Madugu Indo, Madugu Isa Na Garashu, and 
Jagaba Ali. Mallam Audu, the father of Alhassan Dantata, together 
with a younger generation of traders such as Adamu Jakada, Umaru 
Sharubutu, Alhaji Derma Mai Kano Agogo, joined the group at the 
close of the nineteenth century.2 
These men commanded great respect in their societies and among 
long-distance and domestic traders alike. To the aristocrats, they 
were special people whose hard work and dedication brought to the 
emirate the revenue and prestige goods that were needed. Their 
success was something to which the general public aspired. 
Mutual respect and reciprocity characterized the relationship 
between the aristocracy and the merchant class in nineteenth-century 
Kano. This friendly relationship continued into the twentieth 
century when they both were incorporated into the colonial system as 
local elites whose cooperation was needed. As Paul E. Lovejoy 
concludes, when the British conquered the Hausa emirates, the 
Agalawa, Tokarawa and Kambarin Beriberi formed a major part of a 
prosperous commercial class in Sokoto Caliphate. They showed the 
highest income and from their ranks came the wealthy merchants 
consulted by the colonial government for administrative reforms, 
census tabulation, and commercial policies.3 For example, Alhassan 
Dantata participated in formulating commercial and economic policies 
for Kano province from the 1930s until his death in the 1950s.4 He 
was later joined by Ibrahim Musa Gas hash and Alhaj i Ali Naab a, a 
famous cattle trader in the 1950s.5 
Some of the nineteenth-century Hausa entrepreneurs who survived 
the hard times brought by the British conquest of the Sokoto 
Caliphate were quickly incorporated by expatriate firms such as the 
Niger Company, John Holt, and G.A. Gaiser. Thus in 1912 Adamu 
Jakada, a wealthy Hausa merchant, became the first local agent of 
the Niger Company, while Maikano Agogo occupied a similar position 
in G.L. Gaiser.6 
Meanwhile Alhassan Dantata, a major broker in the kola nut trade 
in Kumasi, was busy accumulating capital. When the railway reached 
Kano in 1912 and the groundnut trade showed tremendous potential for 
growth and prosperity, he left Kumasi for Kano to become a pioneer 
indigenous trader in this growing trade.7 Soon he developed a 
clientele whose influence extended as far as Katsina Province. This 
brought him into the limelight of the political economy of Kano 
during the colonial era. By the time he died in the 1950s, his sons, 
Alhaji Sanusi Dantata, Aminu, and Muhammed Dantata had joined him in 
his business. It had become a local conglomerate with groundnut 
stores and shops spread over the length and breadth of Northern 
Nigeria.8 
The alliance with the colonial regime and expatriate firms gave 
these pioneer Hause entrepreneurs and their descendants an edge over 
the Hausa petty traders in less privileged positions. They served as 
middlemen between the general public and the various expatriate 
firms to which they were agents. Thus imports from European firms in 
Kano passed through them and some Lebanese, Arab, and Syrian 
middlemen. Similarly, exports for European firms were collected by 
them through their clients. As a result of this, their importance in 
the political economy of the province was enhanced, even though they 
were dependent on some expatriate firms for the supply of imports. 
As in the nineteenth century, their houses continued to be centers 
of commercial act1v1t1.es. From their quarters imports were 
distributed to all parts of the province and to some extent the 
region. At the same time, their clients brought supplies of primary 
produce, such as groundnuts, hides, skins, and cotton in preparation 
for transportation to the coast for export. 
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To limit the cost and risks of elaborate administration, the 
expatriate firms confined their local agency to those few men they 
chose from the start. To participate in the new commercial order, 
indigenous entrepreneurs who did not become direct agents clustered 
around the chosen indigenous entrepreneurs for the sub-agent or 
clients positions or they remained in the domestic commercial circle 
dealing in goods like cattle, dried fish, and meat. Others hovered 
around Lebanese, Arab, and Syrian middlemen for such positions. 
This structure of relationship and the distribution of goods and 
services within the colonial economy remained intact until the eve 
of independence. After independence, the descendants of this early 
colonial elite and their associates inherited the reins of economic 
or political power from the departing expatriate officials. This 
completed the life cycle of this local elite group. Starting as 
dominant figures in their society in the nineteenth century, by the 
1950s the merchant class in Kano regained their prominence which 
they had lost to expatriate firms during the colonial era. From the 
1950s, they came to increasing political power as the British 
administrators prepared to go away. Examples of such people are 
Alhaji Inuwa Wada, Baba Danbappa, Aminu Dantata, Sanusi Dantata, 
Ibrahim Musa Gashash, Uba Ringim, Alhaj i Ali Nabagu and others. 
Together with their associates and clients, they today constitute 
Kano's group of indigenous manufacturers. 
As independence approached, these indigenous middlemen dominated 
the politics of independence and commercial activities in Kano.10 
They manipulated and influenced government policies to their own 
benefit. A good example of such manipulation is the emergence and 
life of the Kano Citizen Trading Company. The establishment of this 
company in 1950 was financed by soft government loans, and was 
sustained through government patronage.11 This would not have been 
possible were it not for the influence its owners, prominent Hause 
merchants, brought to bear on the government. 
Post-independence development projects and those of the 1970s 
created entrepreneurial opportunities whose benefits have mainly 
accrued to these men and their associates. Even after they left the 
civil service and active politics, their interests were still being 
cared for by those in positions of direct political and 
administrative power. Such people were previously their subordinates 
in the civil service or others whose rise to such positions was 
financed or influenced by them. Where such a relationship does not 
exist between them and present office holders, the services they 
require are easily obtained through a third party. 
The difficulties faced by those who are not members of this 
oligarchy in acquiring the services needed for the economic growth 
and development of entrepreneurs limit the expansion of this class. 
Thus we see that political contacts and machinations work two ways; 
while they promote the interests of those with such contacts, they 
retard those entrepreneurs who do not have them. I would therefore 
argue that as a result of such practices in Kano, the basis of an 
indigenous entrepreneurial class is limited. This is especially true 
of those sectors whose prosperity depends largely on government 
spending. These include manufacturing and construction industries. 
Although the above is true, it should not be taken to mean that 
these powerful business magnates have woven such a fine net around 
entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent that new entrants are 
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completely blocked. On the contrary, it is being argued that the 
process of entry into the class of industrialists is determined by 
one's access to certain services. Unless one belongs to the 
structure of relationships which facilitates access to these 
services, either as one of the entrepreneurs or as their associates 
and cients, to become an industrialist is more or less impossible. 
This practice affects the socio-economic development of Kano, and 
the indigenous entrepreneurs in particular. In spite of the 
existence and influence of such factors on economic development, 
scholars who examine the development of indigenous entrepreneurs in 
Africa hardly make reference to such variables. This, I believe, has 
been due to the methodological and conceptual framework within which 
they have approached the issue. 
The growth and development of indigenous private industrial 
entrepreneurs in Kano since the 1950s has been stimulated primarily 
by growth in government spending, rather than by government policies 
specifically designed to promote industrial expansion. The benefits 
accrued from this spending have been manipulated by an oligarchy 
which has evolved over the years. The proceeds from this 
manipulation are then ploughed into manufacturing and other 
activities, while some are used to sustain the relationships from 
which resources are generated. 
Because government expenditure is fundamental to the prosperity 
of these entrepreneurs, they still engage in distribution, 
construction, and realty businesses into which such spendings are 
directed. For example, there are many construction activities which 
the government has and for which contracts have to be awarded. 
Similarly, with the growing bureaucracy there is an insatiable need 
for both residential and office accommodation which in most cases 
are rented from realtors. With the conviction that distributors are 
to a large extent to blame for the inflation spiral in the economy, 
the government of Kano State, like any other government in the 
country, has become an entrepreneur distributing consumable goods 
through its various agencies such as consumer co-operative shops. To 
do this, contracts to supply these products need to be given out to 
contractors. In fact, the manufacturers in Kano also distribute the 
goods manufactured by their firms to the general public and 
occasionally to the government through their relatives or clients. 
In this sense, they are corporate enterprises within which there are 
all types of activities, with the manufacturing enterprise at the 
center. 
The same oligarchy acquires other services from the government 
through the contacts they have with the administrators and 
politicians who may be their associates or clients. When consumer 
products are to be imported as an anti-inflation measure, for 
example, the import licenses go to them through the contacts they 
have with government officials. When the government needs supplies 
for its cooperative shops, schools, houses or offices, the contracts 
to supply such are granted to the members of the oligarchy. 
Invariably, the manufacturer in Kano is also a distributor and hence 
a speculator who reaps windfall profits in an inflationary 
environment such as the one in Nigeria. 
In such circumstances it becomes profitable to invest in 
political power and connections, since these are essential 
conditions for access to inputs, incentives, and contracts issued 
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and controlled by the state. Contacts and relationships, therefore, 
play significant roles in the development of indigenous 
entrepreneurs, especially in the manufacturing sector where most of 
these services are needed. 
At this juncture, a distinction should be drawn between the 
activities of the oligarchy at the state and the federal levels. 
Before the new government in Kano, they controlled or influenced 
both the formulation and administration of policies at the state 
level. The administration of the incentives in Kano State designed 
to encourage the development of industrial entrepreneurs such as the 
Small-scale Industry Credit Scheme, government patronage, contracts 
and the resources of Kano Investment and Properties Limited, and 
Kano Co-operative Bank, were formulated, administered, and later 
influenced by these men. 
At the federal level, they influenced and still influence the 
administration of the various industrial incentives through their 
counterparts and associates. It should be pointed out that policies 
such as tariff, import duties, and others, which have general 
application and the benefits of which are enjoyed by all, are beyond 
the control of these powerful entrepreneurs either at the state or 
the federal level. On the other hand, those policies which relate to 
day-to-day routine administration are the areas which they control. 
Such policies include those relating to import licenses, foreign 
exchange, tax holidays, and others. One's ability to have access to 
these depends on his relationship with the administrators who are 
either members of a national class of oligarchs to which they belong 
or on which they exercise great influence. Through such means, their 
business interests are promoted and protected. 
At the local level, even the antagonism between these 
capitalists and the PRP government in Kano does not seem to have had 
a serious impact on them. Crucial services and incentives needed for 
the growth and development of manufacturers are administered in 
Lagos where their influence .is still strong, 12 Furthermore, as the 
economic system in Kano could collapse if they are openly 
antagonized, the government has been forced by this and other 
considerations to be compromising. On top of all these, they still 
have their associates in Kano state government who could facilitate 
their access to certain services. As a result, their influence is 
still greatly felt both inside and outside the government in spite 
of its revolutionary proclamations. 
The net effect of government industrialization policies has 
therefore been the development of an oligarchy of politically and 
financially prominent people who control access to the opportunities 
created by the government to encourage the development of indigenous 
entrepreneurs and industries in the state. Thus, in spite of public 
utterances to industrialize the economy and the various 
institutional arrangements made for the industrial take-off, results 
have not been very impressive. This is partially due to the 
manipulation and machination of these oligarchs and the pattern of 
investment imposed on them by the existing socio-economic 
structure,13 
Both in terms of industrial activities and the persons involved, 
the industrial base in Kano is very narrow. Discounting the Dantata 
family, the Rabiu brothers, the Gas hash brothers, the Alhaj i Ado 
Dandawaki group, the Bayajidda family and individuals like Alhaji 
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Sani Mashal, Alhaj i Baba Danbappa, Alhaj i Bababa Badamasi, Alhaj i 
Inuwa Wada, Alhaji Uba Ringim, Alhaji Garba A.D. Inuwa, Alhaji 
Mustapha Danlami and their associates both in the public and private 
sectors, the indigenous basis of Kano State industrial sector is 
completely non-existent.14 Among themselves and their expatriate 
partners, they own more than 90 percent of manufacturing 
establishments in Kano. Foreign entrepreneurs who want to invest in 
Kano look to them, not necessarily because they alone have the 
necessary capital to pursue such investments, but primarily because 
they and their associates alone have the contacts which facilitate 
access to services crucial for the sustenance and prosperity of 
industries. 
It should be pointed out here that the predominance of these men 
has not been due to any legally defined institutional barriers. On 
the contrary, it has been established and perpetuated through their 
manipulation of the administrative and political mechanisms which 
create and execute these opportunities. Thus, through such 
bureaucratic and administrative machineries, the resources of the 
various financial institutions and industrial incentives have been 
used more by these men than by any other group of people in the 
society. This has been the case either because they have been the 
policy makers and administrators of such policies themselves, or 
because they have been the patrons or associates of these 
administrators. In the early 1950s, for example, Alhaji Baba 
Danbappa, a member of this oligarchy, served on the committee set up 
to explore and examine means and ways of encouraging indigenous 
entrepreneurs.15 
Alhaji Danbappa's contribution in this discussion reflected, 
without a doubt, his commercial ambitions and the means of promoting 
them. Being a part of the planning committee for the consequent 
policy tools, he had access to the benefits accruing from such 
policies.16 
Alhaji Aminu Dantata, another member of the oligarchy, also 
served on the ccxnmittee which explored the possibility and need for 
an industrial development bank in 1959. When the bank came into 
reality in 1963, he was made its first executive director. 17 In 
such an administrative position, his access to the resources of this 
bank can hardly be doubted. Similarly, when he was the commissioner 
for Trade, Industry and Co-operatives in Kano State from 1972 to 
19 75, his access to the resources of the Kano State Investment 
Company (a company administratively closely linked to his ministry) 
and the Small-scale Industry Credit Scheme (which was under his 
direct administration) cannot be disputed given the general picture 
in Nigeria. There have been and still are many cases of such duality 
of roles among the Kano entrepreneurs.18 
Similarly, the various contracts through which government 
spending is channelled have been dominated by this group of people 
through the same means. Thus, the financial benefits accrued to 
those development projects in Kano in agriculture, roads, schools, 
hospital construction and others have been reaped by these men more 
than by any other group in the society. 
The notion of domination used here does not imply an absolute 
state. There have been other entrants into this privileged class. 
These new entrants, however, have succeeded in becoming part of this 
group through their relationship with the members of the oligarchy 
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who need support from the lower ranks of the society to maintain and 
sustain their predominance. What domination implies, therefore, is 
hegemony and its consequent overtowering influence in decision 
making and the distribution of the benefits accrued to such 
decisions. 
Illustrated by the cases of Amin Dantata and Baba Dan Bappa 
Kano, indigenous industrialists have spent most of their lives in 
the worlds of business and politics. Where they did not directly 
engage in the administration of their political offices, they played 
a very crucial role in the background as lobbyists who influence 
decisions considerably. In such positions these men were and stil 1 
are able to influence policies and accumulate capital with which 
they have established and sustained their businesses. Before leaving 
such administrative or political positions, they put their clients 
in key positions so that through them they still exercise some 
control on the running of the government. 
'.lhe Manipulation and Machination of the Oligarchy 
'.lhe problem of political manipulation was and still is of such 
overriding importance that all other difficulties around public 
support and services to promote economic growth assume a secondary 
role. '.Ibis is illustrated in the cases of the former Regional Loan 
Boards in the 1950s and 1960s and even the Kano State Investment and 
Properties Ltd. and the Kano State Co-operative Bank, both 
established in 1972. These were and still are used to sustain the 
party in power by providing finance to political supporters.19 In 
most cases, the people responsible for making decisions on the loans 
and other financial services of these institutions were the same 
business people in Kano. '.Ibey had their businesses which wre managed 
by relatives and clients at the time they were politicians or civil 
servants. On the board of the Norther Nigerian Development Board, 
for example, were Alhaji Shehu Ahmed, the Madawaki of Kano, and 
Ibrahim Musa Gashash in 1953/54 and 1958/59, then regional minister 
for land and survey. In 1956/57, Ibrahim Waziri Gumel, another 
regional minister, and Ibrahim Musha Gashash represented Kano on the 
Northern Nigerian Marketing Board (N.N.M.B.). 
This group was later joined by Aminu Dantata, a powerful 
business tycoon. 20 Alhaji Ado Bayero, the present Emir of Kano, 
was the representative in 1959/60 when he was the Chief of the 
Native Authority Police. Serving on this board with him was the 
Madawaki. In 1960/ 61, Bayero continued to serve on this board, 
representing his associates.21 In 1963/64, Alhaji Danwawu, whose 
son is now a prosperous businessman and a member of the oligarchy in 
Kano, represented Kano on the board of the N.N.M.B. The same year, 
Alhaj i Sanusi Dantata, who was then deputy permanent secretary in 
the Northern Region Ministry of Trade and Industry, was the chairman 
of the Northern Region Licensed Buying Agents Committee, 22 which 
determined who could be a licensed buying agent. 
In the Regional House of Assembly, similar people represented 
Kano. In 1955, Alhaji Uba Ringim, who owns a food processing 
industry in Kano today, was a mamber of the Northern House of 
Assembly. In 1956, Alhaji Shehu Ahmed, Alhaji Ahmadu Dantata, 
Ibrahim Musa Gashash, and Alhaji Ali Babegu, the father of one of 
the indigenous manufacturers today, were members of the Northern 
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House of Assembly. Alhaji Tijani Hashim and Alhaji Haruna Kasim also 
became parliamentarians in 1958. In 1960/61, Uba Ringim came back 
together with Alhaji Aminu Dantata, Alhaji Baba Nabegu, Alhaji 
Dantata, and Alhaji Ali Nabegu.23 
Even though these men might not have had any planned strategy to 
exclude "low-class" members of Kano from participating in the 
politics of the day, the fact that they and their close associates 
alone had the means to do so perpetuated their preponderance in the 
system. In such a situation, those coming from below could 
participate only through the financial support of this powerful 
group. In this way, such people, dependent on these prominent 
politicians-entrepreneurs, became their clients who later could be 
elevated into high positions whereby they would protect not only 
their own interests but those of their financiers and patrons. 
It becomes obvious that the prominent entrepreneurs in Kano in 
the past and even today still dominate the economy. In the 1950s, we 
have seen this predominance in the support and patronage given to 
KCTC. In the 1960s, the fact that these men were both the 
entrepreneurs and politicians of the day suggests their dominance 
among the beneficiaries of the loans given out to individual 
indigenous entrepreneurs. In 1961/62, for example, Alhaji Alhassan 
Dantata and Sons still· owed the Northern Region Development 
Corporation £170,000, which was higher than any other loan to an 
indigenous entrepreneur in the records of the corporation. That same 
year Alhaji Uba Rimgim, who was then a parliamentarian, owed the 
corporation £40,000, which he borrowed for his 
macaroni-manufacturing company.24 
The practical economists would argue that such a decision was 
influenced by the lender's belief that it is easier to retrieve a 
loan from rich borrowers. Without denying this economic rationale, 
it should be pointed out that, in add it ion to this explanation, 
there was the influence that such rich men brought to bear on 
decisions concerning such loans. If the ability of the borrower to 
pay back a loan lends credibility, then the big money owners were no 
more credible than the small borrowers because cases of delinquent 
loans were equally high among both rich and the less-wealthy 
borrowers. In fact, considering the extent to which the bourgeoisie 
could manipulate, as seen from the records of some of the financial 
institutions, defaulting was more likely to be higher and in fact 
was higher among the big borrowers. 2 5 In view of this, such 
practical economic rationality would not apply to the situation 
treated here. 
These men approved loans of the various quasi-government 
financial institutions for themselves or for their associates. Where 
they were not the sole determinant of decisions in certain cases, 
they lobbied the appropriate administrators for favorable decisions 
on their requests. In some cases, they financed the political 
careers of candidates who consequently stepped into key positions in 
the bureaucracy. 
In such circumstances, these clients would 
their interests. Thus both those in active 
playing it from outside converged to dominate 
which also meant dominating. the economic scene. 
protect and promote 
politics and those 
the political scene 
Today, in cases where these businessmen are no 
politics, their interests are still being protected 
longer active in 
by those who are 
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currently active and who were either their contemporaries or 
subordinates when they held political power. Before leaving active 
politics, some of them planted their sycophants or associates in key 
positions and it is such people today who award them government 
contracts and facilitate their access to incentives outlined by the 
government and to bank loans. 
Where this provision was not made, access to such officials for 
these services is facilitated through a contemporary or associate 
who might know such an official. Where such is not possible, the 
entrepreneur is left with the alternative of having to give a 
kickback through which he may eventually establish a contact which 
will continue to facilitate his access to resources along that line. 
Such kickbacks are usually in cash.26 
These men also buy services through political donations for 
party or social activities. An entrepreneur may donate a hundred 
thousand Naira to party funds and in return acquire certain servip<;d 
crucial to the successful operation of his firm, or be awardec with 
a huge contract by either the individual or government whose success 
has been facilitated by this financial support. Through such 
manipulation and machination, therefore, entrepreneurial and 
bureaucratic elites dominate the scene because they alone have the 
access to, and resources to sustain, such contacts. 
It was this type of lobbying and machinations that business 
politicians used in the late 1940s to make the Northern Regional 
Development Board grant them a loan of C30,l00,00 to start their 
company, the Kano Citizens Trading (KCTC). As a result of this 
approach, this loan and subsequent ones carried an interest rate of 
only 3 percent and was to be repaid over a period of ten years or 
more.2 7 The property to be purchased or built from the loan, the 
company building itself, was to serve as the collateral for the 
loan. On the surface, this gesture on the part of the Development 
Board could be taken to mean economic nationalism. However, if we 
consider that a different group of indigenes might not have received 
the same treatment from the government of the Northern Region as the 
KCTC did, this generosity was more than a mere nationalistic 
gesture. Consequent to this was the desire of the elite to 
perpetuate itself. 
A year after the company came into operation in 1951 it ran into 
a problem of running costs. Consequently, its owners, who were the 
politicians and administrators of the day, lobbied the government of 
the region to grant it another soft loan of £30,000 which was to be 
repaid in eleven years, Meanwhile, other companies operating in Kano 
did not receive such treatment from the Development Board, Even 
though they got loans from the board, such loans were never as 
substantial as those to the KCTC, and the terms for their loans were 
more stiff.28 
Furthermore, the owners of KCTC lobbied the government to 
instruct all its functionaries to make their textile purchases from 
their company. Thus native authority police uniforms in the region 
were made from the product of this company, Textile needs were 
provided by the company, and it is not unlikely that official 
residential houses were supplied their textile needs from the 
products of this company. In general, there was a very strong 
official support for the company which probably would not have been 
the case if the owners were not in positions to influence the 
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government. 
Today, this corrupt practice still exists. During Gowon's 
regime, for example, there were several cases of such practices in 
Kano. In a report, the then military governor of the state, Alhaji 
Audu Bako and the secretary to the military government, Alhaj i 
Howeddy, are said to have used their offices to promote their 
businesses and those of their friends. 29 According to this report, 
Audu Bako took unilateral decisions in handling the finances of the 
Kano State Investment Corporation to lend money to his friends and 
associates .30 
Alhaji Audu Bako also pulled the government of Kano State into 
the Kano Citizen Trading Company Ltd. According to the report, this 
was done by the governor to bail out his friend Alhaji Baba 
Danbappa, who owned more than 60 percent of the company's total 
shares by 198t.31 It is also possible that Alhaji Baba Danbappa, 
in his capacity as the commissioner for establishment and service 
matters used his influence to bring the government into his company. 
Another way the elites used their offices to better themselves 
and help their associates while in power is demonstrated by the 
activities of Sir Ahmadu Bello and Ibrahim Musa Gashash. In an 
interview with Ibrahim Tahir, Alhaji Umaru, a businessman in Kano 
and the Kano chairman of the Traders Union in 1973, said: 
Gashash and Sir Ahmadu knew our problems. Sardauna was my 
father's client. We prayed for his success on the Koran and one 
day he said to me, "Alhaji the white men will sooner or later 
have to leave the commerce of this country to local people. I 
beseech you, find us anyone among your friends who are not 
profligate and who have a head for business and I will authorize 
credit for them." So I made a list of my brothers and my close 
friends, six or eight in all. We obtained heavy loans and as you 
can see we have never looked back. I multiplied my own thrice 
over within about two years. As for Gashash he gave all the big 
merchants and the traders the land outside the city in the 
Syrian quarters. He knew everybody here. 
There are many examples of such practices. The late Mallam Aminu 
Kano in an interview told me how he acted along the line of Sardauna 
and Gashash when he mobilized the elite entrepreneurs in Kano to 
take the place of departing Igbo businessmen when the civil war 
broke out.33 Even though such practices have been beneficial to 
these entrepreneurs, they have serious implications for Kano's 
economic and social development. 
Conclusion 
Even though such practices have benefited those entrepreneurs, 
they have serious implications for Kano's economic and social 
development. The existence and preponderance of a class of 
entrepreneurial and bureaucratic elites in Kano, whose control of 
the economy has brought unbearable hardships on the poor, have some 
serious socio-economic inequality which, together with Kano's 
revolutionary tendencies, have made the city increasingly 
volatile.35 Secondly, the machination of this dominant class has 
made it nearly impossible for those outside their structure of 
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relationships to invest their surpluses in productive ventures. 36 
The numerous bottlenecks put in the way of prospective entrepreneurs 
to acquire services such as import licenses, bank loans and credits, 
and the numerous industrial incentives have forced these 
entrepreneurs into easy and fast-paying ventures which are not 
necessarily productive and which may not be their choice.37 
This also generates tension which could be a source of 
socio-economic conflicts which, in turn, create an atmosphere of 
political instability that scares away investors.38 The few who 
persist in spite of such impediments bribe their way to acquire such 
services or to buy the patronage of these oligarchs. 
To facilitate continuous access to these services and to sustain 
the relationships which make this possible, there is a need for 
entrepreneurs to have business ventures which have quick returns. 
Such business ventures are not the type which can generate more 
productive forces in the economy. These include real estate, 
contracts, and other fast paying businesses. In fact, emphasis is 
put more on the possession of such ventures to sustain the 
give-and-take practice inherent in the patron-client relationships 
which cut across the society. As a result, material reciprocation 
takes precedence over all other things. Consequently, attention 
given to business ventures is largely contingent on how much they 
can keep this spirit of reciprocity without any embarrassment to the 
money owners. This means that business ventures with long gestation 
periods, such as manufacturing, are bound to suffer from lack of 
sizeable financial backing. Those which have overcome their teething 
problems and therefore generate resources are deprived of 
reinvestment by the practice of gratification and bribery. In this 
way, such firms are bound to suffer and even eventually fold up. It 
could therefore be said that the structure created primarily by this 
practice among these oligarchs constitute impediments to socio-
economic development and strengthens the inherent contradictions 
within the social system. 
11 
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